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A SUGGESTION FOR THE RENEWAL
OF THE CANON LAW
MONG the recommendations adopted by the Canon Law
Society of America at its last annual meeting was one for
bringing the insights of legal traditions besides the Roman
to bear on the canonical system. The following suggestions are
derived from the insights of my tradition, the common law tradition. That aspect of the common law tradition that I believe
has most to contribute to the development of the canon law is
concerned not so much with the particular rules of law as with
the basic techniques of legal analysis. The common law tradition of legal analysis, as it has been understood by jurists of all
persuasions in this country for a generation and more, calls for
an approach to law in terms of what it is attempting to accomplish in the society which it governs, and what actual effect its
operations have in that society and its members.
Looked at steadfastly in these terms, the canon law shows
forth a special character of its own, a character that the traditional Roman law format has tended to conceal. The task of
ordering the corporate life of the people of God is very different
from the task of ordering the external relations of a secular society. The canonists attest this difference by blending moral
teaching with their legislation in a manner that no secular system, however ethically oriented, would admit. The medieval
canon law furnishes more examples than the modern, but such
canons as canons 124 and 1018 of the present Code show that
the same spirit is still at work. By the same token, commentators
on canon law and commentators on moral theology seem to
shift freely from one discipline to the other. Thus, a current commentary on the Code announces happily that it "settles authoritatively in a few words many important questions of moral theology about which experts have disputed for centuries." And
a recent definitive history of a certain moral question not only
devotes several chapters to the canonical authorities on the ques-
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tion, but ends with recommendations which seem to envisage
dealing with the question as a matter of legislative policy.
This blurring of the distinction between law and morality cannot, it seems to me, be really avoided either in canon law or in
Catholic moral theology. To confine the canon law rigorously
within an orientation to external order such as we expect of secular law would be to belie its whole history. By the same token,
to insist that the authoritative pronouncement of moral doctrine
is limited to infallible pronouncements, the rest being mere
opinion, is greatly to oversimplify the traditional place of authority in the Church. As I put it in another place, addressing
the medieval situation, where the true character of the canons
was closer to the surface, though still submerged by the overlay
of Roman law:
The canons present themselves to the individual Christian as
the corporate witness of the Church to the principles governing
her interior life, and to the shepherds of the Christian people as
the collected experience of the Fathers in bringing those principles home to their flocks. The obligation imposed by the
canons, then, is less juridical than pedagogical: it is the obligation of a wise man to allow himself to be governed by the counsels and experience of those wiser and more experienced than
himself. The peculiarities we discern in the enforcement of the
canons are explained by noticing that the obligation is to be
guided-neither to follow unthinkingly nor to innovate rashly.
"Therefore every scribe instructed in the kingdom of God is
like to a householder who brings forth from his treasure new
things and old." 1
In applying this analysis to the medieval canon law, I criticicized it at the same time for its failure to make adequate provision for the external order of the Church, for the marshalling of
the available personnel and resources to perform the essential
work and ministry of the Church in the society to which it belonged. On this score, we have much less to complain of in the
I Cf. 'The Canon Law as a Legal System-Function, Obligation and
Sanction," Natural Law Forum 45(1964)79.
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modem Code. There are particular difficulties, but it seems
that on the whole the effective distribution of personnel and resources is provided for through suitable legal and administrative
devices. Today, the criticism is all the other way. Modem
critics of the canon law complain of "legalism," by which they
mean a commitment to external order so coercive as to stifle
the interior life of the Church.
But if we look at the actual operation of the canon law, rather
than at the Roman law-oriented commentaries of the canonists
or the self-descriptive portions of the canons themselves (e.g.,
certain of the Normae Generales of the Code), it will be apparent that this complaint of legalism does not go to the essence
of the system. The canons, as they have been developed and observed in the history of the Church, are marked by great flexibility in the character of the guidance they offer or the obligation
they impose. Broad pastoral norms for the guidance of the faithful or the exercise of the ministry have always existed side by
side with narrowly juridical (in the sense of secular law) regulations of the external order of the Church. In modern legislation, such as the Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy of the Second Vatican Council, the same is true today. The canon law
system is, and always has been, capable of mingling pastoral and
juridical elements in precisely that combination best suited to
the exigencies of the Church in the particular case. It is truest
to its essential nature when it does just that.
The canon law, then, unlike a secular legal system, aims at
both an interior and an external order. In addition to organizing personnel and resources for the common good of the Church,
it harmonizes the freedom of the sons of God with the corporate
participation of the Church in the life of her Divine Spouse. In
addition to ordering a variety of particular interests in the light
of a common good, it orders a variety of particular spiritual
experiences in the light of a common interior life, a variety of
particular voices in the light of a common proclamation of the
Word of God.
The breadth and mystery of these ultimate objectives are re-
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flected not only in the freedom with which the system juxtaposes
pastoral and juridical elements, but also, on a more technical
level, in the complexity and subtlety of its operational effects.
By "operational effect" I mean the immediate significance of a
legal norm for the person to whom it applies, its consequences
for his conduct or his affairs.
Of course, insofar as the canon law embodies pastoral norms
for the guidance of the faithful, its chief operational effect lies
in the willingness of the faithful to be guided. But in certain
areas it has been felt that the pastoral or administrative necessities of the Church called for more precise standards; and in the
whole system the bent of the canonists themselves has been
toward measuring up to the precision of secular legal systems.
Accordingly, there has been-has probably always been-a
tendency to formulate both the system in general and its particular dispositions in terms of specific operational effects. Let
us, then, in the light of the current state of moral philosophy
and legal analysis, consider the operational effects that have
been thus formulated, and what they mean in fact. The main
categories seem to be the following:
1. Physical effect
These elements of the canon law which deal with offices and
benefices, and the like-that is, with the distribution of personnel and resources-seem to have about the operational effect
they purport to have. The personnel and resources are by and
large in fact distributed in the manner envisaged. Indeed, even
in countries where the secular arm is not generally available to
enforce the mandates of the Church, the secular authorities will
intervene in many cases to ensure that property devoted to ecclesiastical purposes is used according to ecclesiastical law, or
to prevent persons from holding themselves out to the public
as occupying ecclesiastical positions to which they are not entitled.
Aside from rules governing personnel and resources, the most
important externally measurable effect of the canon law is pre-
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sented by the rules governing the ministrations of the Church.
These are not only an important body of rules in their own
right; they also constitute the major sanction for many other
moral and canonical rules. Their operational effect is somewhat
spotty. They depend, of course, on the willingness of the clergy
and the hierarchy to carry them out, and that willingness seems
to vary from one time and place to another. In contemporary
American practice, at least, I think we can say that one canonically ineligible for ordination will probably not be ordained, a
canonically impeded marriage will probably not take place in
church, and a person canonically deprived of Christian burial
will probably not receive it.
On the other hand, when it comes to excommunication-that is,
the deprivation of the day-to-day offices of the Church-traditionally the most potent of ecclesiastical sanctions, the effect appears to depend almost entirely on the willingness of the person
excommunicated to refrain from seeking the forbidden ministrations. It is simply not customary to turn people out of the church,
or even away from the communion rail, because they are excommunicated. And even if it were, most such persons would
have no difficulty in finding a church where they were not known.
2. Educative and vituperative effect
The canon law contains a series of forms of varying intensity
and force whereby the norms to which the Church adheres may
be applied to particular circumstances and dramatically brought
home to the faithful. It is in this series that excommunication and
other such censures seem to me to have their proper place in the
system. From solemn excommunication with candles dashed to
the ground, the available denunciations range all the way to a
simple announcement by a diocesan chancery that a certain
prominent Catholic has not acted in accordance with the teachings of the Church in some matter that has appeared in the press.
The automatic censures attached to a number of general
norms have also a certain effect in this regard. When a prominent
Catholic marries a divorced person, for instance, it is possible
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to say not simply that he has sinned grievously, but that he has
incurred an automatic sentence of excommunication. This has
no doubt a certain effect of fixing in the public mind the recognition that he has gone counter to the teaching of the Church.
We may suppose also that these censures, both general and
specific, have an effect on the sinner himself as well as on the
public. The moral principles that he has violated, presumably
already present to his conscience, may confront him with a new
urgency when they take the shape of an ecclesiastical censure.
3. Moral effect-"on pain of sin"
The moral theologians do not seem generally to distinguish
between canon and civil law in the moral obligations they impose
under the Fourth Commandment. These are supposed to depend
on the importance of the subject-matter and the intent of the
legislator-both dubious guides when we come to a canon with
a long history behind it. When it comes to particular dispositions
of the canon law, the moralists tend to deal with violations in
terms of the particular virtue a given disposition is supposed to
implement, rather than in terms of obedience to authority. This
is in accord with ancient canonical tradition, and with the
ambivalence, to which I have already alluded, between law and
morality in the canons.
There are, to be sure, certain canonical norms supported
by a fairly solid theological opinion that it is sinful to violate
them even once. For instance, it is generally taught and accepted,
at least in this country, that missing Mass even once on a Sunday
or holy day of obligation without a good excuse is a sin. However, it does not appear to be taught or accepted anywhere that
this force attaches to all canons as such, or even that principles
intrinsic to the canonical system will furnish a basis for deciding
whether a given canon is one of those it is sinful to violate. All
that can be said of the canons generally in this regard is that
habitually to ignore them-to violate the obligation to be guided
by them-would seem to be a sin against the Fourth Commandment.
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Still more difficult than the question of whether general canonical norms bind under pain of sin is the question of whether
particular censures bind under pain of sin. Here the canonists
address themselves to the point, but when we follow through on
what they say we cannot be sure of its significance. Thus, the
article on Excommunication in the Dictionnaire de Droit
Canonique is quite clear that an excommunicated person sins
grievously if he receives the sacraments. On the other hand, it
appears that nothing can be ground for excommunication if it is
not mortally sinful, and that a person in a state of mortal sin sins
grievously if he receives the sacraments. Thus, it is difficult to see
what the excommunication adds.
4. Validity of sacraments
The validity-as distinguished from the licitness-of the sacraments is affected by the canon law only in the cases of matrimony, penance, and perhaps confirmation when that sacrament
is administered by a priest rather than a bishop. Except in the
case of matrimony, it is difficult to proceed from the fact of
invalidity to any further operational effect. Thus, if it should
appear that an uncanonical confirmation by a priest is invalid,
the operational effect of the invalidity would depend on the
theological significance of not being confirmed-which, though
real, is somewhat difficult to pin down.
The situation is somewhat comparable with the canonical
rules relating to the validity of the sacrament of penance- to
jurisdiction in the internal forum. It does not seem to be the
teaching of theologians that God will not forgive my sins unless
I confess them sacramentally. All that can be said is that I am
under a canonical obligation to receive the sacrament of penance
once a year, and that if I am conscious of mortal sin I am under
another canonical obligation to receive the sacrament of penance
before I receive the Eucharist. Presumably, I do not fulfill these
canonical obligations unless I receive the sacrament of penance
validly. The operational effect of invalidity, then, depends on
the moral force of these canonical obligations.
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When it comes to matrimony, the situation is a little clearer.
Those who are invalidly married because of some canonical impediment undispensed, or because of some failure to follow the
canonical form, are living in a state of concubinage, sin grievously, and are barred from receiving the sacraments. Furthermore, either of the parties to such a union is permitted to
abandon the other and contract a valid union with someone else.
But even here there are difficulties. It is doubtful that a modern
theo'ogian, accustomed to look at the total orientation of the
personality toward God, would regard an invalid marriage as
simply a series of isolated acts of fornication. Indeed, the canons
themselves recognize that consent to be invalidly married is not
simply consent to live in a state of concubinage. Canon 1083
provides that knowledge or belief that a marriage will be invalid
does not necessarily exclude matrimonial consent. Other canons
make it clear that consent to be invalidly married can provide
the basis for a valid marriage if the grounds of invalidity cease
or are dispensed.
To resolve all these questions, of the operational significance
of an invalid sacrament would require a formulation of the
operational effect of a valid sacrament, which, in turn, would
require the opening up of new frontiers in sacramental theology.
Clearly, it is not appropriate for the canon law to attempt to deal
with these matters. Rather, its formulations should be such as t3
avoid taking sides on any question at present debated among
theologians, and to avoid inhibiting future theological development. There are specific situations in which the canon law will
have to attach consequences to the invalidity of a sacrament,
but, as a general matter, the best approach would seem to be to
regard such invalidity as sui generis among the operational effects
of the canon law, leaving any further elaboration to the theologians.
5. Other spiritual effects
The canons provide in one place or another for a variety of
spiritual effects besides the invalidily of sacraments. The loss of
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the suffrages of the Church by excommunicates, the invalidity
of sacramentals, the establishment or non-establishment of
sponsorship at baptism or confirmation, the gain or loss of
indulgences or of special blessings attached to objects, the consecration or desecration of churches, are all examples. Here too it
must be left in most cases to the theologians to draw the operational consequences. In a few cases, however, the spiritual effect
has liturgical consequences that appear in the canon law. Thus,
a priest who becomes irregular is forbidden to say Mass, and a
church that becomes polluted must be reconciled before services
can be held there. Also, there is the special case of religious
profession. Where it is invalidly made, it does not bind, and the
supposed religious may return to the secular life.
The canon law, then, in its immediate operational effects, just
as in its ultimate objectives, presents a variety and subtlety that
set it apart from any secular legal system. For this reason, it
seems to me, the attempt to confine the canons within an analytical framework borrowed from secular law will unavoidably
obscure the real character of the canon law and impair its usefulness as an instrument for governing the Church. Thus, I think
that a renewal of the canon law must start with the very structure
of the Code.
To show how this is the case, let us consider the existing
structure a little more specifically. It is broken down into five
books, corresponding roughly to an analytical framework that has
been current in Roman secular law since before Justinian's time.
These books are:
I Normae Generales, consisting of general statements about
when laws take effect, whom they oblige, and the like.
H De Personis, dealing with clergy and religious, with the
authority of the different grades of the hierarchy, and with
lay associations.
IH De Rebus, dealing with sacraments (including matri-
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mony), divine worship, the teaching office of the Church,
offices and benefices and the temporal goods of the Church.
IV De Processibus, dealing with formal judicial procedures.
V De Delictis et Poenis, dealing with various misdeeds and
the external punishments to which they are subject.
Each of these divisions raises structural problems of its own.
First, the Normae Generales, with their precise definitions of
who is and is not bound by a law, and when and where it is in
effect, seem inconsistent with the role of pastoral guidance that
plays so large a part in the original conception of the canons,
and with the canonical tradition of drawing freely on the collective experience of the Church in other times and places. There
are certainly areas in which the necessities of the Church require
a precise understanding of what is and what is not the law, but
they constitute a relatively narrow part of the whole scope of the
canon law. Thus, the placing of these technical rules at the
beginning of the Code sets a tone for the whole document that
is not in accord with the true nature of the system.
Turning next to the second book of the Code, De Personis,
we find that it combines uneasily canons governing the various
states of the Christian life (with the notable exception of the
married state, which is dealt with among the sacraments in the
third book, De Rebus) and canons governing the institutional
functions of the various grades of the hierarchy. In the resulting
mixture, the mysteries of Christian vocation and the personal
pastorate are obscured by the technicalities of institutional form,
while the just and orderly functioning of the Church's institutions
is obscured by the mystery of her hierarchial order.
The third book, De Rebus, is divided into six parts. The first
three deal with the sacraments and other matters of liturgy and
worship, the fourth with the magisterium of the Church, and the
last two with benefices and other material resources. If we once
accept the breakdown between persons and things as a necessary
one, it is reasonable enough, I suppose, to treat these matters
under things rather than persons. But the combination thrusts
severely into the background the place of the sacraments and the
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liturgy in the personal life of Christians and the place of material
resources in the institutional life of the Church. Baptism, marriage, indulgences, oratories, benefices, and patronage rights are
all dealt with the same way-what each "thing" is, how it may
be established, how it may be acquired, on what terms it is to be
kept, and how, if at all, it may be lost.
The treatment of benefices in this fashion reflects a longstanding canonical conception that has led many generations of
the clergy to think of themselves more as possessing rights than
as discharging functions. In modem times, however, the development of administrative controls on the offices to which most
benefices are attached has greatly eroded the traditional viewpoint-no thanks to the Code provisions dealing with benefices.
From a contemporary standpoint, the most serious criticism
of the arrangement of De Rebus is in its treatment of the sacraments. Consider in this regard a canon that probably affects the
lives of ordinary Christians as seriously as any in the Code,
canon 1014, creating a presumption in favor of the validity of
marriage. The presumption is in certain respects anomalous. As
applied to one who wishes to contract a new marriage, it runs
counter to the general principle of resolving doubts in favor of
liberty. As applied to a marriage that has in fact been broken
up, it runs counter to a general principle of not disturbing an
existing state of affairs in case of doubt. It seems to rest on an
idea of the marriage as having an existence independent of the
parties. One author tells us that an action for a declaration of
nullity is an accusatory action in which the marriage enjoys the
benefit of the doubt because it stands accused. Actually, the
rule was evidently developed originally for the protection of
persons involved in a subsisting marriage, a situation in which it
makes perfect sense. It is the conceptual structure of the canonists
that applies it to marriages long broken up.
The part of De Rebus dealing with the magisterium of the
Church does not seem to be open to the same criticism as the
others. That part is divided basically in accordance with the
different media through which the magisterium is exercised, and
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is articulated in terms of the duties of ordinaries, pastors, and
the like. Structurally, it seems unexceptionable, although somewhat incongrous in its position sandwiched between the other
parts of De Rebus as I have described them.
The fourth book of the Code, De Processibus, is organized
rather like a secular code of procedure, beginning with matters
of court organization, jurisdiction and venue, continuing with
general matters of procedure, and finally taking up rules peculiar
to particular proceedings. Structurally, the main trouble with it
is its failure to indicate what part formal judicial proceedings
actually play in the life of the Church. In fact, most of the institutional necessities of the Church are dealt with administratively.
Even matrimonial cases, which form the bulk of the business
of the judicial tribunals, are customarily handled with much less
formality than these canons suggest. The Code should be so
structured as to deal with judicial processes in context among
the other institutional resources of the Church, and to indicate
the circumstances in which these processes are meant to be
invoked.
The objection to the organization of the fifth book, De Delictis
et Poenis, should be apparent from what was said above concerning operational effect. Basically, the matters treated in this book
involve three things, the solemn denunciation of certain types of
offenders as a form of witness against what they have done, the
control of access to the sacraments and ministrations of the
Church, and the administrative control of the ecclesiastical
organization. These matters should be dealt with in their several
contexts.
Against this background let me sketch in my own suggestions
for the proper structure of a Code of Canon Law. They are
grouped around what seem to me to be the four focal points of
the system. The first of these, the one that has always been in
some way primary, is the Witness of the Church to the Revelation of Jesus Christ, and to her own experience of the living out
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of that revelation through time. It is the tension between that
corporate experience and the personal communication and reception of it that constitutes the basic dynamic of the canon law.
Those canons, then, that deal with how and by whom the
corporate experience is proclaimed, and in what way it informs
the personal witness of Christian pastors and faithful, belong in
the forefront of the Code.
The second focus is the Life and Conversation of Christians.
A number of canons deal with the different manifestations of the
Christian life, and how each can be given its proper scope in
harmony with the corporate life of the whole Church. These
canons present in varying combinations ancient traditions of the
Church, authoritative interpretations of divine revelation, and
prudential judgments as to the needs of the Christian community.
They show a good deal of variety also in the moral force with
which they present themselves to the consciences of the faithful,
and the consequences of departing from the standards they
impose. What they have in common is that they set patterns for
the guidance of Christians in living their lives. As I have said,
this element of guidance seems to me primary in the canons.
For this reason, I think these canonical guidelines belong
together, rather than in separate categories dictated by an attempt
at conventional legal analysis.
The third focus is the Sacramentaland Liturgical Life of the
Church. Canons dealing with sacraments and liturgy, as I have
indicated, are in great part sui generis in their operational effects.
They seem to me also pretty much sul generis in their
relation to the personal lives of Christians. Participation in the
Church's sacramental and liturgical life plays a central role in
the Christian life, but the regulation of the Church's sacramental
and liturgical life is operationally and morally quite distinct from
the regulation of the Christian life as such. Thus, to be as open
as possible to the true significance of the canons governing the
sacramental and liturgical life, we should allow them a distinct
place of their own.
The fourth focus is the Institutional Life of the Church. The
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canons which establish or regulate the institutions through which
the Church exercises authority or distributes personnel and resources look more like law in its familiar secular sense than do
other canons. But the analogous secular law is public or administrative law, not the law contained in the civil codes. The
canons in this area, then, have a common secular analogue, and,
by the same token, a common operational effect. Placing them
together in a single category responds to these common elements,
and also emphasizes the ancillary position of these institutional
matters in the interior spiritual life of the Church.
With these four focal points providing the basic topical breakdown, the "books" of a revised Code could be developed, I suggest, that would express more clearly what the canon law is
about and what part it plays in the life of the People of God.
Into the framework thus established should be introduced not
only the canons of the existing Code in their new order, but also
major canonical documents that have come down since the Code
(for example, that regulating secular institutes), additional
treatment of administrative practices that have grown up in
recent years (such as the dissolution of marriages under the
privilegium fidei), specific adjustments that experience or new
consideration has made seem appropriate (such as provision for
the defense of authors or teachers accused of doctrinal error),
and, finally, such conciliar documents as seem to offer guidance
for the excercise of the Christian ministry, the conduct of
Christian worship, or the leading of the Christian life.
What follows in an outline of a Code set up according to the
foregoing suggestions. Under the various titles I have put brief
explanations of what I have in mind.
Book I-The Witness of the Church
I have explained already why I think that the role of witness
is in some way the central one of the canon law. For this reason,
I would put most of the canon law's account of itself in this Book.
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Here also belong the canons dealing directly with the exercise
of the magisterium, those dealing with the personal-as distinguished from the institutional-aspects of the pastorate, and
those dealing with ecclesiastical censures whose basic function
is to show forth the Church's condemnation of the conduct to
which the censure applies.
Under the head of witness belong also, it seems to me, the
canons dealing with relations with non-Catholic Christians, or
with the secular world. Over and over, contemporary formulations on the subject of these relations use the term "dialogue"-a
form of speech, or a form of love, in either case a form of witness.
This understanding of the content of the Church's witness
determines the three Parts into which I have divided this Book.
Part I-The Witness of the Church before the World. Here I
would include missions, dialogue with non-Christians, and work
for the establishment of peace and justice in secular society.
Related to the last of these, but institutionally distinct, are the
various activities carried out under ecclesiastical auspices for the
relief of sickness and want. These activities, to be sure, are often
carried out in connection with missions, but it seems wise to keep
them juridically separate. Otherwise, we risk having the Gospel
message diluted into temporal benevolence, and the relief of
suffering tainted by the accusation of an ulterior motive.
I suggest, then, the following titles for this Part:

1. The Proclamation of the Word of God, dealing with missions and the like.
2. The Proclamationof the Moral Order in Society, dealing
with Catholic action, with moral teaching on secular affairs, and with cooperation with the agencies of civil society.
3. Dialogic and PastoralRelations with non-Christians.Here
would come new canons, based on conciliar documents,
expressing the sincere concern of the Church with all men
and their problems, and the responsibility bf Catholic
bishops and pastors (indeed, of all Catholics) to concern
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themselves with whatever will serve for the spiritual and
moral enrichment of those with whom they come in
contact.
4. Institutions of Social Service.
Part II-The Witness of the Church before Other Christians.
This Part would have to be constructed virtually from the ground
up. The existing Code has a handful of canons on relations with
non-Catholic Christians, but they seem to have no relevance
whatever to existing practice. It is clear that these irrelevant and
truculent canons should be laid to rest, but how far it would be
wise to go in setting up new ones on the subject is open to
question. Arguably, the introduction of any formal norms into
this developing area might inhibit desirable patterns of growth.
On the other hand, given the close connection Catholicism has
always maintained between the Church as a spiritual or mys,
terious entity and the Church as a juridical institution, it may
well be that a truly imaginative institutionalization of our relations
with other. Christians would contribute greatly to our regard for
them as brothers in Christ. Be that as it may, I should think that
a set of judiciously constructed canons could consolidate the
progress that has thus far been made in our relations with othar
Christians, without inhibiting further progress. Needless to say,
such canons should concentrate as much as possible on what
Catholics are now permitted or encouraged to do, rather than
what is forbidden them.
Given this limited objective in the formulation of canons in
this area, I suggest the following titles, which should be for th
most part self-explanatory:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Prayers for Unity.
Ecumenical Dialogue.
Recognition of Sacraments and Worship.
Pastoral Care and Conversion. This is one area in which
we meet with problems of some subtlety-the tactful affirmance of the traditional pastoral responsibility of Catholic
bishops and pastors for all Christians in their territory;
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the extent to which pastoral solicitude is to be exercised
in encouraging non-Catholics to make the most of their
present religious affiliations, rather than becoming Catholics; the manner of receiving converts consistently with
due ecumenical regard for their former connections.
5. Mixed Marriage. Most of the canonical treatment of this
subject will have to be put among the canons on matrimony. But there should be here some guidelines for the use
of couples who wish to grow in the spiritual unity of
Christian marriage while remaining faithful to their separate denominations. The new rules on participation by
non-Catholic ministers in the marriage service should go
here, as should any canons that can be developed on family
prayers and the like.
6. Collaboration with other Christiansfor Social Action and
Christian Witness.
Part III-The Witness of the Church before Catholics. Here,
as should be apparent from what has gone before, I have in mind
both a broad general treatment of the various means the Church
employs for the instruction of the faithful and a more detailed
treatment of the institutions specifically directed to that work.
By instruction, of course, I mean something more than education;
I mean the whole process of forcefully confronting the faithful
with the tenets and demands of their religion. For dealing with
the separate aspects of instruction thus broadly considered, I have
the following titles to suggest:
1. The Teaching Office of the Church. Here I would like to
see a set of theological guidelines for the role of ecclesiastical authority in guarding and setting forth the truths of
divine revelation, and for the manner in which the teaching
of authority is to be accepted by the faithful. Here also,
it seems to me, should be put the canons dealing with institutional controls on the content of Catholic doctrinethe procedural rights of those accused of doctrinal error,
and whatever is to survive of the controls on reading and
publication of books. There are cogent arguments for
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putting this material under other titles, but what I find
persuasive is the necessity of orienting it toward the maintenance of the Church's collective doctrinal commitments
-rather than the suppression of doctrinal error as a kind
of personal moral fault.
2. Preaching.There are now a number of canons on this subject forming one of the titles of the Part of De Rebus that
deals with the magisterium of the Church. It is possible
that these will need some changes or additions to bring
them into line with the current tendency to integrate
preaching into the liturgy. I do not believe that this tendency has gone so far that the whole set of canons on this
subject should be put under liturgy rather than here; rather,
I would favor expanding the treatment at this point to
include some treatment of the instructional character of
the liturgy.
3. PastoralCare. The present Code treats the obligations of
bishops and pastors for the care of their flocks in connection with its treatment of the administrative duties of
bishops and pastors, and its treatment of how one becomes and remains a bishop or pastor. I would make a
division, putting the canons defining the pastoral office
(the existing canons on the point, supplemented by conciliar formulations) at this point, and the administrative
and tenurial aspects elsewhere. While I realize that there
is a certain logic in combining a treatment of the tenure of
an office with a treatment of all its duties, I think that a
properly apostolic conception of the Christian pastorate,
of all that is implied in the cure of souls, requires that
it be given its place in the life of the Church, rather than
fitted in among the other duties attached to a given office.
4. Discipline and the Exercise of Ecclesiastical Authority.
Here I would put the canon law's own account of itself,
and of the ground and manner of the exercise of ecclesiastical authority. Most of the material contained in the
Normae Generales of the present Code would go here,
with certain modifications to bring out more clearly the
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elements of flexibility discussed above. Here also I would
put an account of the particular censures by which the
mandates of ecclesiastical authority are given personal application. I have indicated above that this is one of the
three functions of the material dealt with in the De Delictis
et Poenis of the present Code, the others being control of
access to the sacraments and control of personnel and
material resources.
5. Doctrine and Instruction. The existing canons on catechetical instruction can go here, along with those on
schools and seminaries, with whatever modifications may
seem appropriate. Some treatment of other instructional
media, such as the Catholic press, might also be desirable.
Also, I would like to see all this material introduced by a
treatment of the general guidelines for relating sp -culative
theology and other intellectual disciplines to the authoritative teaching of the Church, and vice versa.
Book II-The Life and Conversation of Christians
There are not many canonical guidelines for the living of the
Christian life, as distinguished from the operation of the institutional forms in which that life is embodied. Such guidelines as
there are, supp!emented by conciliar materials, papal encyclicals
and allocutions, and new formulations, could be put in this
Book, extrapolated, as far as possible from institutional aspects.
Part I-The ChristianLife in General. Here I would put material dealing with the spirituality of Christians in general-that
is, unrelated to any particular state of the Christian life. Most
of this material would be rather general, although there are a
few specific rules. The following titles will indicate how I would
organize this material:
1. Sanctifying the World.
2. Participationin the Witness of the Church. This should
include not only a statement of the apostolic role of every
Christian, but also a treatment of good works and social
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service as a form of Christian witness. Cf. Book I, Part I,
Title 4.
3. Participationin the Sacramental and Liturgical Life of the
Church. The sacramental and liturgical life itself is the
subject of the Book following this. The treatment here is to
indicate the role of that life in the personal life and personal sanctification of the individual Christian. It should
also include the specific requirements the Church imposes
in that regard-annual confession and Communion, Mass
attendance, presenting infants for baptism, the eucharistic
fast. Finally, this is the place for canons controlling the
right to participate in the Church's sacramental and liturgical life-the effects of disciplinary excommunication, irregular marriages, or conduct condemned by the Church,
and the extent to which the sacraments and the liturgy are
open to non-Catholics.
4. Private Observances. Here can go whatever is to survive of
the law of fast and abstinence, indulgences, and the like,
together with whatever the Church has to say authoritatively on such matters as private vows, spiritual exercises,
pilgrimages, and even meditation. All this should be introduced with a few general principles as to the place of
private prayer and private devotion in the life of the Christian.
Part Il-ParticularStates of the Christian Life, Except Marriage. Here would go those forms of the Christian life that have
a special vocation and a special spirituality. The basic divisions
are the clerical state and the state of the evangelical counsels.
The latter is divided under the present canon law into the religious life, dealt with in the Part De Religiosis of the Book De
Personis of the Code, and the life of the secular institutes, dealt
with in the constitution ProvidaMater. A further division is incipient in the portion of the Code dealing with societies in which
the common life is lived without public vows. I would consider
also as a division of the life of the counsels the life of the secular
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tertiary, dedicated to living the lay life in the spirit of the counsels under the direction of a religious order; this is at present
dealt with in the Part De Laicis of the Book De Personis.
In view of the current rethinking of the place of the religious
life in the Church, it seems likely that the divisions now in use
will one day require considerable modification. Especially, it
seems that the distinction between active and contemplative religious will need to be sharpened if each state is to fulfill its particular mission. On the other hand, the chapter on religious in
the constitution De Ecclesia of the Second Vatican Council
makes it clear that the Church regards the profession of the
evangelical counsels as essentially the same for all. In proposing the following titles, I have kept the existing distinction between religious communities and secular institutes, without attempting to introduce further topical divisions:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The
The
The
The

Clerical State.
Profession of the Evangelical Counsels in Community.
Profession of the Evangelical Counsels in the World.
Secular Life in the Spirit of the Evangelical Counsels.

I have not attempted to provide here for another category which
I suspect may come into some prominence in the future, that is,
the category of persons who submit themselves to some form of
community discipline for the service of the Church, without
professing the evangelical counsels. A venerable precedent for
such persons is provided by the secular canons of the Middle
Ages. Some conceptions of the religious life that are currently
being mooted would seem to correspond to such a vocation as
this better than to the religious vocation as it has been traditionally conceived.
The framework I am proposing here involves a separation of
material dealing with the clerical and religious states from material dealing with the institutional embodiment of those states.
This separation has obvious disadvantages from the standpoint
of a logical presentation of a conventional legal topic. I adhere
to it nevertheless, because it seems to me essential if we are to
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give adequate scope and emphasis to the personal, non-institutional elements in the clerical and religious states.
Actually, the division, once resolved upon, is not as difficult
as it looks. My criterion involves putting here as to each state
the conciliar material and the few canons on its nature and
spiritual significance, and its place in the life of the Church, then
the canons on initiation into the state in question, its privileges
and obligations, and its voluntary or involuntary termination.
I find that the remaining canons on clergy and religious, once
these have been extracted, are quite effectively limited to those
dealing with institutional forms-diocesan and parochial administration for the clergy, superiors, chapters, and administration of temporalities for the religious.
Part III-The Married State and the Christian Family. The
present Code treats of the entry into the married state, and of the
obligations of married persons to each other and to their children
under the Part De Sacramentis of the Book De Rebus. This approach seems to me not only to give inadequate emphasis to the
vocational and ascetic aspects of marriage, but also to belie the
theology on which the Church bases its claim to regulate the
subject. The teaching of the theologians is that marriage is a
personal relation which Christ raised to the dignity of a sacrament, and that what the Church regulates is not the sacrament
itself, but the personal relation to which the sacramental character attaches. It is in view of this theological teaching that I
would include here the canons dealing with the entry into the
married state, and the obligations that state entails, leaving only
the form of marriage to be dealt with among the sacraments.
In the titles I propose for dealing with the subject, I have
divided the subject in terms of actual relations, treating the sacramental character as something that does or does not attach,
depending on the nature of the relation. These are the titles:
1. Conjugal Love. Here I would put a statement of the essential character and spiritual significance of the human relationship to which the sacramental character attaches un-
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der appropriate circumstances. In entitling this relationship
"conjugal love," I do not mean to emphasize the personal
character of marriage to the exclusion of the procreative;
rather, I would bring out the essential interdependence of
the two.
2. Sacramental Marriageamong Catholics. Here it should be
made explicit that Catholics are not free to marry except
in accordance with the laws of the Church. By failing to
comply with those laws, they cut themselves off not only
from the sacrament of matrimony, but also from all participation in the Church's sacramental life. Here I would
set forth these two principles, and then deal with the impediments (other than want of form) to marriage, and
how, if at all, they may be dispensed from. Here also
should go the canons governing separation of spouses.
3. Sacramental Marriage among Other Christians.The existing canon law of marriage makes no distinction between
Catholics and non-Catholics except by exempting the latter
from the rules relating to form and from the impediment
of disparity of worship. Thus, the union of two baptized
non-Catholics is a sacramental marriage unless one of the
diriment impediments of the Code applies. I would modify
this rule in two respects.
First, I would introduce some discrimination into the
recognition of sacramental marriages among baptized persons who are not active Christians. If the intent necessary
to the validity of a sacrament is an intent to do what the
Church does, it is difficult to see how persons can be said
to enter an important relationship with that intent if the
Christian religion plays no part in their lives. And even if
it were theologically possible, it does not seem either necessary or desirable to impose the burdens of sacramental
marriage on persons who have no general concern to live
as Christians. I would find some formula to allow for the
recognition of sacramental marriage among non-Catholics
only when they are or subsequently become active in the
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practice of the Christian religion, or when they have or
subesquently form the intention to live as Christian man
and wife.
Second, I would make some allowance for the regulation of non-Catholic marriages by the religious groups to
which the parties belong, or, in some cases, by the state.
Such a change would accord with present-day ecumenical
thinking in recognizing the corporate existence of other
Christian bodies; it would also open the way to marriage
rules for non-Catholics suitable to their particular needs.
It is difficult to see why other Christians should not make
their own rules on such matters as the marriage of first
cousins or the effect of sponsorship in baptism-especially
as the impact of the Church's rules for Catholics is much
modified by the possibility of dispensation. By the same
token, it seems reasonable to permit the laws of the state
on matters like age, notice of intention, or even blood tests,
to govern the marriages of those Christians who customarily accept the competence of the state in such matters.
4. The Marriagesof Unbaptized Persons. Here should go the
canons governing the Pauline privilege, an account of the
current practice in privilegium fidei cases, and the canons
dealing with the impediment of disparity of worship, and
how it may be dispensed. All this should be prefaced with
a general statement of the nature of marriage as a natural
union, and how such unions may become sacramental. In
accordance with what I said concerning the marriages of
baptized non-Catholics, it would seem desirable, if theologically permissible, to provide that baptism alone,
without the intention of living as Christian married persons, would not be sufficient to make a sacramental marriage of a non-sacramental marriage.
5. Civil Marriage. Under this title would be treated those unions accepted as lawful marriages in the civil community,
but not falling into one of the three classes just mentioned.
As I have already indicated, it seems better to regard such
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a union as a defective marriage rather than as a nullity.
The primary obligation of the parties, the primary pastoral
orientation of the Church, should not be to break up such
a union, but to validate it, and attach to it the character
of a sacramental marriage. In some cases this will be impossible, either because the marriage is forbidden by divine
law, or because one party raises a serious obstacle to the
other's living as a Catholic. But in the ordinary case,
where the parties come before the Church and express
their intention to live as Christian married persons, a sanation of the marriage should be allowed as a matter of
course. Furthermore, unless something appears to the contrary, it should be presumed that there is no obstacle to
such a sanation.
6. Family Life and the Raising of Children. There are in the
present Code a few canons on the Christian education of
children and the like that could be put under this title. I
would add to these a few basic and generally accepted
norms on the nature and obligations of family life. Perhaps
such matters as the duty to pay a living wage could be
dealt with here also.
Book Ill-The Sacramental and Liturgical Life of the Church
I have already discussed my reasons for treating this as a
separate subject in the canon law-that the obligation of these
canons, their operational effect, and their significance for the
personal lives of Christians, are all both unique and theologically
subtle. The Constitution of the Second Vatican Council on the
Sacred Liturgy presents a good deal of material that could serve
to introduce this subject. For the rest, the existing canons could
serve without much modification.
Part I-The Sacraments.
1. Baptism
2. The Holy Eucharist
3. Penance (excluding those canons dealing with indulgences,
which I would put in with the observances to which the
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4.
5.
6.

7.

indulgences are attached, despite their historical connection with the relaxation of penance)
Confirmation
Unction
Order (modified somewhat to do away with obsolete
grounds of irregularity, and to provide for the newly established ordination of married men to the diaconate)
Matrimony (form only)

Part l--Sacramentals and Public Prayer.
1. Sacramentals
2. The Divine Office (including the obligation to say it, and
the rules governing attendance in choir)
3. Other Public Prayers (novenas, processions, and the like
-with some elaboration on the existing canons)
4. Saints and their Cult
Part III-Churches and Holy Places.
Part IV-The Liturgical Year (including some general treatment, together with a statement of the general forms of piety
appropriate to the different parts of the year, and the specific
obligations attached to specific days or seasons).
Part V-Christian Burial.
Book IV-The Institutional Life of the Church
By separating those canons dealing directly with institutional
forms and their operation from those canons dealing with other
matters, I would hope to place the institutions in a context conducive to a recognition of their ancillary position in the economy
of salvation, and to an efficient control of their operation. Nevertheless, there is an element of mystery in the institutional life of
the Church as surely as there is in the other aspects of her being.
Something of this mystery must be expressed in the canons introducing this subject. It should be made clear that the institutional
Church is not radically distinct from the Mystical Body, and that
particular institutional forms are not to be conceived as standing
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apart from the personal, the pastoral, the apostolic, the affective
elements in the Church's life, but as essentially united to those
e'ements, providing them with the structure they require. The
following divisions of the subject are intended to bring out this
character in the institutions they describe. It is contemplated that
the treatment of each institution will begin with an account of its
pastoral and spiritual goals, followed by a more detailed treatment of its structure and operation.
Part I-The Hierarchy and its Institutions. There is material
in the constitution De Ecclesia of the Second Vatican Council
that may serve as an introduction to this topic. The titles I
suggest modify somewhat the treatment in the existing Code, in
order to achieve what seem to me desirable changes in emphasis.
The most important of these modifications is the dismantling of
the existing title De suprema potestate deque iis qui eiusdem
sunt ecclesiastico iure participes. This title includes the pope
himself, ecumenical councils, the cardinals, the curia and other
agencies of delegated papal authority, metropolitan and other
episcopal agencies above the diocesan level, and plenary and
provincial councils. The concept and the allocation of "supreme
power" in the Church raise formidable problems of legal theory,
and of theology as well. But we do not really have to resolve
these problems to recognize that the matters covered in this title
could be more meaningfully arranged through the use of
narrower concepts. In the first place, I would put the pope and
the agencies that derive their authority from him in a single title
by themselves.
The agencies of ecclesiastical authority which, while subordinate to the pope, do not actually derive their power from him,
are the general council and the episcopate. Whether the general
council is simply the episcopate under another form or has a
status of its own is another subtle question that might better be
left open. In combining general and local councils in a title
separate from the other agencies of episcopal authority, I have
followed a fairly clear juridical classification that may or may
not reflect a deeper theological reality.
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The canons dealing with primates, patriarchs, metropolitans,
and the like, are now attached to this same title on the supreme
power. It would seem that, with the recognition of a collegial
authority in the episcopate, these canons might better be conceived as regulating the organization of the episcopate for collective action.
The foregoing discussion will indicate what I have in mind
with the following titles:
1. The Roman Pontiff and the Institutions Exercising his
Authority
2. The Episcopate and the Agencies of Provincialand Diocesan Administration-I am in some doubt as to whether
provincial and diocesan administration should be put together in a single title. My reason for deciding in favor of
the combination is to leave room for some experimentation
in the transfer of functions between diocesan and provincial
levels.
3. General and Local Councils
Part II-The Clergy and the Pastorate. As those matters
relating to the personal character of the clergy have already been
dealt with, this Part can confine itself to the cure of souls and
the organization of the clergy to carry it out. I conceive of this
subject in two titles:
1. The ParishPriest, the Parish,and ParishInstitutions. Here
I would develop the concept of the cure of souls, and set
forth the obligations of the parish priest. Following these
matters would come the appointment and tenure of the
parish priest, insofar as the applicable rules differ from
those for other ecclesiastical offices. Finally, there could be
introduced at this point such offices and institutions as
may develop out of the current interest in enlarging the role
of the laity in the conduct of parish affairs.
2. Recruitment, Distribution, Compensation, and Discipline
of the Clergy. Here I would put incardination and the like,
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and those disciplinary sanctions (such as supension) which
especially involve the clergy. Here too would go those rules
of conduct that affect the cleric in his relation to the organization of the Church-as distinguished from those rules
already dealt with which affect his personal life in the
clerical state. The existing Code makes somewhat the
same distinction, placing the personal obligations of the
clerical state in a title of De Personis, and treating organizational failings in a title of De Delictis et Poenis.
In this same title I would include all the canons dealing
with ecclesiastical offices and benefices. I would modify the
existing law on this subject by including all the material on
appointment and tenure under offices, leaving the benefice
in its proper position of an adjunct to an office. It should be
made clear in the arrangement of the law that the benefice
is not the private property of the incumbent, but is bestowed
on him to support him in the exercise of his office, and that
his rights of tenure exist to afford him suitable security
and freedom in the exercise of the office, not to vindicate
a property right in the benefice.
Part III-Institutionsof the Christian Life. As in the case of
the clergy, having disposed of the canons affecting the personal
life of religious and other states, we can confine ourselves here
to the institutional forms in which these states of the Christian
life are embodied. The following titles should require no explanation:
I. Religious Communities and other Institutions of the
Common Life
2. Secular Institutes
3. Third Orders
4. Associations with Ecclesiastical Objects
I am in some doubt as to whether cathedral establishmentschapters of canons-should be made an additional title here, or
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should be included among the agencies of diocesan administration. At present, the role of such establishments in providing an
administrative senate for the bishop seems paramount. As I have
suggested, however, there might be room for a wider use of such
establishments in the future, in which case they might well be
dealt with here.
Part IV-Property Devoted to Ecclesiastical Use. There is a
Part De Bonis Ecclesiae Temporalibus in the Book De Rebus
of the present Code; this can form the foundation for the treatment of the subject here. I would add some treatment of the
manner in which funds are raised for ecclesiastical purposes and
the obligation of the faithful to contribute to the support of the
Church. I would include in this treatment the canons on simony
that appear in the introduction to the De Rebus of the present
Code.
There should also, it seems to me, be introduced into the
canons at this point a treatment of the manner in which the title
to church property is to be held for purposes of civil law. This is
obviously a matter that differs radically from one jurisdiction to
another; nevertheless, it should be possible to lay down some
kind of general criteria which could be used in exercising such
options as the civil law leaves open, or in seeking modifications
of civil law to meet the legitimate needs of the Church.
These points suggest the following titles:
1. Administration, Distribution and Tenure of Property
Devoted to Ecclesiastical Use
2. The Raising of Funds for Church Support
3. Church Property and Civil Law
Part V-Formal Judicial and Administrative Procedures.The
strict separation of powers that has been so influential in the
development of modern secular legal systems has never had
much currency in the canon law. Indeed, in view of the personal
pastorate which underlies the whole canonical structure, I would
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question whether a strict separation of powers doctrine would be
appropriate. But there is in the canons a certain incipient
distinction between administrative and judicial action, and a
somewhat more fully articulated distinction between formal and
informal action. Both these distinctions seem desirable, and
should probably be brought out more fully.
The formulation of these distinctions is a matter of some
subtlety. I would suggest tentatively that formal action is action
following a prescribed procedure, whereas informal action may
be taken without any procedural requirement, and that judicial
action is action taken pursuant to fairly definite rules, whereas
administrative action involves a certain discretion to do what
may seem appropriate. As an example, let us consider the various
ways in which a parish priest can be removed from his office.
Transfer under canons 2162-7 is relatively informal administrative action, though some rudimentary procedures are prescribed.
Removal under canons 2147-56 is relatively formal administrative action-the procedures are minutely prescribed, but the
reasons are broadly discretionary. Deprivation under canon 192,
§2, is formal judicial action. Suspension ex informata conscientia
under canons 2186-2194 is informal judicial action-the procedures are at best rudimentary, but the substantive law is strict.
What I have in mind in this Part is to concentrate on formal
requirements, leaving the substantive law-whether formally or
informally implemented-to be covered elsewhere.
The existing Code makes no express provision for formal
review of informal action to determine whether it is within the
limits of the discretionary power committed by law to the
authority in question. In other words, there is no tribunal in the
Church with a function like that of the French Conseil d'Etat,
no procedure comparable to the American judicial review of
administrative action. "Administrative recourse," the canon law's
nearest approximation to these institutions, is, at least in theory,
as informal as the proceedings from which recourse is taken, and
such formalities as it entails are not explicitly provided in the
Code. It would seem that the law of the Church should make
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express provision for a strictly formal procedure in which the
act of any authority could be set aside if it were found to exceed
the limits of the discretionary power committed to him.
Other suggested modifications of existing procedures-mainly
in the direction of simplification-will appear under the separate
titles:
1. FormalProceduresin General.This title should begin with
definitions of formal action, judicial action, and administrative action, in the terms discussed above. Then, whatever general rules of procedure seem appropriate should
be set forth. Much of the subject can probably be covered
in the ensuing titles which deal with specific kinds of
proceeding. But what is common to all or most types can
be covered here, and there should be in any event sufficient
procedural norms to enable the system to handle miscellaneous matters too rare to be dealt with specifically.
I would think that these general procedural norms would
not need to be as elaborate as the ones contained in the
present Code. Briefer and more flexible standards,
especially in the matter of proof, would afford a desirable
discretion in bringing out the issues in the case and arriving
at the true facts. If necessary, these general norms could
be supplemented by rules adopted by particular courts to
meet their own situations.
2. Courts and their Jurisdiction.The existing Code provides
for an officialis and at least a rudimentary court structure
in every diocese. In many, if not most, dioceses, there is
not enough business to keep this court structure in efficient
full time operation. Still less is there enough business for
the court structure to be backed up by a bar with skill
and experience in presenting cases before it. It would seem
highly desirable, then, for ecclesiastical courts to be constituted on a regional basis, covering more than one diocese,
or even more than one province.
At the same time, there is a strong canonical tradition
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behind regarding the bishop as the fountainhead of judicial
authority in his diocese. Both theological and pastoral
considerations militate against departing from that tradition. I would suggest as a solution to the problem that the
bishops of a given region, or a majority of them, elect a
single officialis, and two or more vice-officiales, who would
hear and determine, in the name of each constituent
bishop, all the cases arising in his diocese, except those he
reserved for his personal determination. These would be
full-time judges, and would maintain a full-time staff, and
at least a small full-time bar, supplemented perhaps by
qualified secular attorneys.
Above these courts could be constituted full-time
appellate courts, perhaps appointed by and acting in the
name of a plenary council, or of the metropolitans of a
given region. These appellate courts could also entertain
formal proceedings for the review of administrative action.
The remaining titles in this Part deal with procedures in
particular kinds of cases.
3. The Imposition of Censuresand the Correctionof Doctrinal
Errors. The laws on these matters, to the extent they do
not already provide for adequate opportunity for the
accused to be informed of the charges against him, and to
respond to them, should be amended to afford such provision. Also, where a book or a teaching is to be denounced, the author or the teacher should be given the
rights of a person accused. These rights should be
established in principle in the Book on the Witness of the
Church. Here, procedures should be laid down to implement them.
4. Matrimonial Proceedings. Except in certain jurisdictions
where canonical annulment is given civil effect, and the
civil law does not provide for divorce, the usual canonical
marriage case is initiated for the sake of someone who
wishes to satisfy his conscience by putting himself right
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with the Church. This being so, it would seem that the
formalities of civil matrimonial litigation are neither
necessary nor appropriate in the common law of the
Church. No doubt annulments should not be decreed on
flimsy evidence or without careful examination. But if a
relatively informal examination of the relevant evidence
shows good ground for considering the marriage invalid,
and there is no indication that additional evidence can be
found, an annulment would seem to be in order without
further ado.
5. Canonization Proceedings
6. Administrative Control of the Clergy. Here I would deal
with the procedures to be followed in such matters as the
removal or transfer of pastors, and the recalling of nonresidents. If the current discussion of the freedom of clergy
and religious to express themselves on public issues should
result in any procedural standards to be met before they
can be silenced, such procedures should be provided for
here.
The distinction between this Title and Title 3 of this Part
(The Imposition of Censures and the Correction of
Doctrinal Errors) lies, as I conceive it, in the purpose of
the rules being implemented. Censures are imposed and
errors corrected as a part of the Church's witness to the
principles of true doctrine and right conduct as she has
received them. Administrative control of the clergy is
exercised in order that the organization of the Church
may effectively accomplish its pastoral aims. The difference
in purpose entails a difference in the balance to be struck
between individual and group interests, and therefore in
the procedural safeguards to be accorded the individual.
The distinction in question is not unknown to the present
canon law. For example, the procedures for removing a
pastor for misconduct are different from those for removing a pastor for incompetence.
7. Proceedings Concerning the Property and Revenues of the
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Church. This would cover administrative proceedings such
as those for obtaining permission to sell or hypothecate
property, and judicial proceedings such as those for determining which natural or moral person is entitled to a given
piece of property or a given fund.
8. Review of Official Action. There should be a definite procedure for setting aside administrative action which exceeds
the power of the person or authority taking it. I think it
would also be wise to make specific provision for appeals
from judicial action. Such provision could be made in the
title on Formal Procedures in General, but I would prefer
to see it separately dealt with. This arrangement would
contribute, I think, to a desirable shift in emphasis from
the merits of the original proceeding to the handling of the
original proceeding by the tribunal or authority appealed
from. This change would be in accord with modem appellate practice in secular systems, and would contribute to
the efficiency of canonical proceedings.
The preparation of a revised Code of Canon Law along the
lines I am suggesting would not be as formidable a task as
might appear. A beginning could be made by transposing whole
titles or groups of titles into new juxtapositions and assigning
new names to them. Once this was done, the additions and
amendments that seem appropriate could be introduced at specific points without great disturbance of the overall structure.
I would envisage, then, three steps in the process. The first
would be the transposition and renaming of the titles of the
existing Code in the manner just suggested. The second would
be the introduction of canonical documents enacted since the
Code, of those parts of conciliar decrees that should be introduced
into the canons, and of whatever else it seemed desirable to add.
Finally, desired changes in the substantive context of the existing
canons could be made within the framework thus established.
These changes would not, it seems to me, bring about any
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radical disruption of the administration of the Church as it is
carried out under the present Code. Like the contemporary
changes in doctrinal and liturgical formulations, they are
intended to bring out with new emphasis something that has
always been present. It is hoped that they will enable the canon
law to take its place in the renewal of the Church in a manner
consistent with its essential character.
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